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4Introduction
1. Introduction
This	first	part	of	the	study	is	devoted	to	the	macroeconomic	effects	of	a	Transatlantic	Trade	and	
Investment	 Partnership	 (TTIP)	 between	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 the	 USA.	 For	 this	 purpose,	
empirical	 models	 of	 the	 world	 economy	 were	 used	 to	 clarify	 two	 essential	 scenarios:	 (i)	 the	
elimination	of	tariffs	in	trade	between	the	EU	and	the	USA,	and	(ii)	a	liberalization	that	goes	far	
beyond	just	eliminating	tariffs	at	a	scale	that	can	be	measured	for	comparable	and	actually	existing	
free-trade	agreements.	Our	approach	differs	from	the	traditional	way	of	dealing	with	subject	in	that	
the	comprehensive	scenario	(ii)	is	defined	using	measurable	experience	with	similar	agreements,	
not	guesses	about	what	is	considered	politically	possible.	Our	results	thus	show	potentials	against	
which	the	success	of	the	agreement	can	be	measured	ex	post	facto.
The	approach	used	in	this	first	part	of	the	study	is	macro-economic	in	nature,	meaning	that	the	
analysis	uses	aggregated	data	by	country.	It	looks	at	the	changes	in	world-wide	trade	flows,	real	
per	capita	 income	and	unemployment.	 In	so	doing,	 it	 identifies	countries	that	would	gain	from	
TTIP	and	 those	 that	would	 lose.	The	second	part	of	 the	 study	 is	microeconomic	 in	nature	and	
examines	the	disaggregated	effects	in	detail	for	Germany.	For	example,	estimates	of	the	TTIP	effect	
on	individual	regions,	industries,	educational	levels	and	occupational	groups	are	presented.
After	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	methods	 used	 and	 a	more	 detailed	 description	 of	 the	 scenarios,	 we	
examine	the	TTIP	effects	on	the	structure	of	world	trade.	We	answer	the	question	“Where	does	
trade	grow,	where	does	it	shrink	and	by	how	much?”	We	then	turn	our	attention	to	TTIP	effects	on	
real	per	capita	income,	i.e.,	per	capita	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP),	which	enables	global	welfare	
effects	to	be	quantified.	Finally,	we	report	on	the	results	of	a	model	simulation	that	allows	us	to	
quantify	the	effects	on	unemployment	rates.	
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2. Comments on the study method
To	obtain	reliable	numbers	for	the	GDP	effect	of	a	transatlantic	free-trade	agreement	on	all	EU	
member	 states	 essentially	 requires	 (a)	 an	 appropriate	 theoretical	 model	 framework	 and	 (b)	
reasonable	scenarios.	For	this	purpose,	we	use	a	computable	general	equilibrium	model	that	was	
developed	at	 the	 ifo	 Institut	 to	 analyze	 the	 free-trade	agreement.1	The	 fundamental	 innovation	
of	 the	model	 is	 that	 it	 combines	 econometric	 and	 simulation-based	methods.	 This	 enables	 us	
to	 ensure	 that	 the	 trade	 costs,	 whose	 reduction	 are	 the	 ultimate	 concern	 of	 every	 free-trade	
agreement,	are	properly	estimated	and	consistently	applied	when	calculating	measurements	of	
welfare.	To	 that	end,	observed	real-world	 trade	 flows	and	empirical	proxies	 for	 the	 factors	 that	
determine	trade	costs	are	used.	The	strength	of	the	model	lies	in	the	fact	that	its	basic	scenario	
is	exactly	reproduced:	This	applies	essentially	to	bilateral	trade	flows	between	a	large	number	of	
countries,	real	income	and	unemployment	rates.	In	the	simulation	of	the	liberalization	scenarios,	
specific	elements	of	the	estimated	costs	of	trade	are	changed	and	the	effects	on	trade	flows,	real	
income	and	unemployment	are	then	calculated.
The	approach	differs	from	commercially	available	CGE	(computable	general	equilibrium)	models	
frequently	used	to	estimate	the	effects	of	trade	liberalization.	In	fact,	most	existing	TTIP	studies	
also	use	CGE	methods.2	In	such	studies,	trade	costs	are	typically	not	estimated	consistently	from	
model	to	model.	Other	modeling	differences	consist	in	the	country	breakdown	and	the	treatment	
of	 unemployment.	 In	 our	 approach,	we	 consider	 all	 countries	 for	which	 bilateral	 trade	 data	 is	
available.	There	is	no	regional	aggregation	or	it	is	only	performed	afterwards,	to	better	clarify	the	
results.	In	many	model	variants,	we	also	assume	frictional	unemployment,	which	arises	from	the	
explicit	modeling	of	the	job	search	process	by	employees	and	employers.	This	modeling	approach	
was	recognized	in	2010	with	the	Nobel	Prize	and	offers	the	advantage	that	it	reflects	the	most	
important	characteristics	of	national	labor	market	institutions	quite	well.
On	 this	basis,	 the	 initial	 equilibrium	 for	126	countries	has	been	calibrated	 in	such	a	way	 that	
the	model	 reproduces	 the	 bilateral	 trade	 flows	 observed	 in	 2007	 (before	 the	 economic	 crisis)	
between	country	pairs	(our	database	includes	15,750	such	pairs)	and	all	GDP	statistics	for	that	
year.3	The	model	is	also	exactly	“calibrated”	for	the	reference	year,	and	it	includes	not	only	the	27	
EU	member	countries	but	virtually	all	economically	relevant	countries	in	the	world.	
1	 This	model	is	explained	in	detail	in	Felbermayr	et	al.	(2013).
2	 	This	applies	to	the	CGE	studies	on	TTIP	for	Sweden	(Kommerskollegium,	2013),	Austria	(Francois	and	Pindyuk,	2013),	France	
(Fontagne	 and	 Gourdon,	 2013),	 and	 for	 the	 study	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 (Francois	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 These	 studies	 were	
frequently	criticized	 in	 the	past	because	 the	ex	ante	 forecasts	 regarding	 trade	and	welfare	effects	 typically	 turned	out	 to	be	
substantially	too	low	in	the	ex	post	evaluation.	Hosny	(2013)	describes	the	design	of	the	regular	CGE	models;	Ackermann	offers	
criticism	(2006).
3	 	Unfortunately	 the	 modeling	 of	 frictional	 unemployment	 is	 only	 possible	 for	 those	 countries	 that	 have	 comparable	 data	 on	
unemployment	rates	and	for	regulating	labor	markets;	see	also	section	6.
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A	further	advantage	of	this	structural	economic	method,	i.e.,	one	that	assumes	an	explicit	economic	
theory,	 is	 that	 unlike	 the	 usual	 econometric	methods,	which	 don’t	 bother	 to	 have	 a	 grounded	
theoretical	modeling	 (called	 reduced	 form	 estimates),	 it	 offers	 the	 possibility	 of	 analyzing	 the	
consequences	of	a	contrafactual	implementation,	such	as	a	TTIP	agreement,	before	one	actually	
takes	place.	This	is	made	possible	by	the	additional	structure	of	the	underlying	economic	model.	
Reduced	form	estimation	generally	allows	retroactive	analysis,	i.e.,	after	implementation,	so	that	
economic	measures	can	only	be	designed	afterwards,	in	order	to	be	able	to	react	to	specific	partly	
negative	 accompanying	 effects	 that	 have	 already	 occurred.	 Finally,	 structural	modeling	 allows	
TTIP	analysis	without	having	to	use	a	central	assumption	of	almost	all	reduced	form	estimates:	
that	 the	general	 equilibrium	effects	 can	be	 considered	 ignorable.4	That	 is	why	 for	 agreements	
like	TTIP,	whose	real	goal	is	to	change	the	general	equilibrium	(change	the	trade	flows	between	
all	 participating	 partners,	 raising	welfare	 in	 the	 participating	 countries),	 it	 is	 essential	 to	 use	
structural	methods.
Understanding	how	to	model	bilateral	trade	costs	is	very	important	for	the	discussion	that	follows	
in	this	study.	The	modern	literature	makes	a	very	clear	and	important	point:	Tariffs	and	other	trade-
policy	barriers,	in	comparison	to	natural	frictions	like	the	sheer	geographical	distance	between	two	
trading	parties,	are	of	relatively	small	importance.5	And	the	quantitative	role	of	tariff	barriers	in	
transatlantic	 trade	 is	 really	 negligible,	 compared	 to	 other	 trade	 costs.6	An	 exact	measurement	
of	existing	trade	costs	is	however	of	great	importance	in	calculating	the	effects	of	liberalization	
scenarios:	 Felbermayr	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 show	 that	 the	 welfare	 gains	 from	 trade	 liberalization	 are	
disproportionately	higher	if	the	trade	costs	are	already	low	in	the	initial	equilibrium.
Figure	 1	 shows	 schematically	 how	 the	 trade	 costs	 between	 two	 countries	 can	 be	 allocated	 to	
individual	categories.	First	 there	are	the	tariffs	which,	as	already	mentioned,	play	only	a	small	
role	 relative	 to	 the	 other	 trade	 barriers.	 The	 remaining	 trade	 costs	 are	 then	 classified	 under	
the	heading	“non-tariff”	trade	barriers.	These	include	a	large	number	of	potentially	very	varied	
elements.	 First	 there	 are	 protectionist	 trade	 policy	measures,	 which	make	 access	 to	 domestic	
markets	 more	 difficult	 for	 foreign	 suppliers.	 It	 includes	 such	 classic	 instruments	 as	 import	
quotas,	 but	 also	 administrative	 and	 regulatory	hurdles	 that	discriminate	 against	 foreign	 firms.	
It	 can	 also	 include	 the	 necessity	 to	 obtain	 approval	 for	 products	 separately	 for	 both	markets,	
done	 frequently	 by	 applying	 different	 approval	 conditions	 and	 procedures,	 different	 standards	
to	environmental,	health	or	consumer	protection	policy;	different	industry	standards,	packaging	
regulations	and	information	requirements;	regulating	access	to	public	procurement	or	economic	
policy	development	programs,	such	as	government	export	credit	insurance;	and	so	on.	
4	 	This	assumption	is	called	SUTVA	(Stable	Unit	Treatment	Assumption)	in	economic	literature.	It	is	a	component	of	the	established	
reduced	form	methods,	which	are	applied	to	policy	evaluation	as	standards.
5	 See	Baier	and	Bergstrand	(2001).
6	 See	the	studies	mentioned	in	note	2	and	Felbermayr	et	al.	(2013).
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Besides	 non-tariff	 barriers	 based	 on	 trade	 policy,	 there	 are	 additional	 trade	 costs	 that,	 while	
politically	 induced,	 have	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 trade	 policy	 in	 the	 strict	 sense.	 For	 example,	
instruments	of	infrastructure,	education	or	labor	market	policy	or	industrial	policy	measures	can	
be	used	to	change	trade	costs.	Some	examples	are	the	expansion	of	transportation	options	or	the	
prominence	of	foreign	languages	in	school	curricula.	
The	 last	 cost	 category	 in	 Figure	 2	 describes	 the	 so-called	 “natural”	 barriers.	 These	 are	 due	 to	
geographic	distance,	lack	(or	presence)	of	a	common	language,	shared	colonial	past,	common	legal	
traditions,	shared	currency,	etc.
Empirically,	all	trade	costs	between	126	countries	are	estimated	in	such	a	way	that	a	trade	flow	
equation	 (gravitation	 equation)	 is	 structurally	 derived	 from	 the	 simulation	model	 that	 is	 used	
later.	By	determining	trade	elasticities,	the	matrix	of	bilateral	trade	costs	(126	countries	times	126	
countries)	can	be	estimated.	Together	with	multilateral	trade	cost	variables	and	gross	domestic	
production	 of	 the	 countries,	 this	matrix	 replicates	 the	 expectation	 value	 of	 the	 trade	 actually	
observed	between	all	countries..
Source: Schematic representation by ifo Institut
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A	detailed	representation	of	the	empirical	model	would	overwhelm	this	study.	Instead	let	us	simply	
mention	here	that	econometric	estimation	of	the	gravitation	equation	has	made	great	progress	in	
recent	years,	 including	the	ground-breaking	work	of	Anderson	and	van	Wincoop	(2003;	2004).	
They	show	that	the	trade	costs	within	other	pairs	are	important	for	making	an	accurate	estimate	
of	trade	costs	within	a	country	pair.	For	example,	how	much	geographical	distance	restrains	trade	
between	 two	countries	also	depends	on	 the	average	distance	of	 these	 two	countries	 from	their	
other	trading	partners.	An	additional	problem,	for	which	there	are	now	good	solution	methods,	
is	 the	presence	of	 country	pairs	 in	which	 there	 is	no	 trade.	 In	 the	older	 literature,	 this	was	a	
problem.	Egger	et	al.	(2011)	and	Felbermayr	et	al.	(2013)	accordingly	use	non-linear	methods	for	
estimating	the	gravitation	equation.	These	econometric	procedures	also	underlie	the	estimates	in	
this	study.	Finally,	it	is	important	to	consider	that	trade	costs	are	themselves	dependent	on	trade	
volumes.	This	applies	especially	to	the	likelihood	that	a	free-trade	zone	will	be	created	between	
two	specific	countries.	To	obtain	accurate	estimates	anyway,	instrument	variables	have	to	be	used.7	
The	estimate	then	delivers	two	important	results:	first,	a	matrix	of	trade	costs	between	all	country	
pairs	and	second,	the	average	effect	of	a	free-trade	zone	on	bilateral	trade.
	
7	 	When	trade	costs	are	themselves	driven	by	trade	volumes,	they	cannot	be	treated	as	„exogenous“.	This	has	implications	for	the	
econometric	strategy;	see,	for	example,	the	work	of	Egger	et	al.	(2011).
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3. TTIP-Scenarios
How	 does	 a	 free-trade	 agreement	work	 in	 general,	 and	 a	 Transatlantic	 Trade	 and	 Investment	
Partnership	(TTIP)	in	particular?	Such	agreements	have	a	direct	effect	on	trade	costs	between	the	
two	countries	 involved	because	they	reduce	the	tariff	barriers	and	certain	non-tariff	barriers	to	
trade.	Because	the	scale	of	the	effects	depends	on	the	related	macro-economic	variables	on	which	
the	amount	of	total	trade	costs	are	dependent,	it	is	important	to	estimate	the	underlying	trade	cost	
matrix	accurately.	Indirect	effects	then	result	in	the	general	equilibrium	through	feedback	from	
prices	and	income.	The	central	issue	in	this	context	can	be	stated	this	way:	ow	is	the	trade	cost	
matrix	changed	by	TTIP?
We consider two scenarios: 
•	 	Tariff	scenario:	In	this	case,	we	assume	that	the	trade	cost	matrix	described	above	is	changed	
so	that	the	trade	costs	between	the	USA	and	European	countries	are	reduced	by	the	extent	
of	the	tariffs	now	being	applied	in	these	bilateral	relationships.	Certain	exceptions	for	special	
products	may	remain	in	force,	but	on	average,	a	reduction	to	zero	or	virtually	zero	for	all	goods	
seems	reasonable.	The	average	tariff	rate	in	transatlantic	trade	amounts	to	about	3.5%.	That	is	
how	much	trade	costs	between	the	EU	and	USA	are	reduced	in	the	tariff	scenario,	while	trade	
costs	with	other	country	pairs	remain	unaffected.
•	 	Comprehensive	liberalization	scenario:	In	this	case,	we	adapt	the	trade	cost	matrix	so	that	the	
resulting	simulated	change	in	trade	flows	corresponds	to	the	econometrically	measured	trade	
creation	from	observed	free-trade	agreements.
The	tariff	scenario	requires	no	additional	description.	The	comprehensive	liberalization	scenario,	
on	the	other	hand,	 is	substantially	more	complex.	The	reduction	of	 the	stated	barriers	releases	
real	resources	that	can	be	used	for	useful	activities,	which	result	directly	in	welfare	gains	for	the	
economies	affected.	That	applies	regardless	of	how	the	non-tariff	barriers	are	ultimately	reduced:	
by	mutual	recognition	of	different	standards,	by	harmonization	or	by	elimination	of	measures	that	
are	purely	discriminatory	in	nature.	
In	comparison	with	the	comprehensive	 liberalization	scenario,	 the	elimination	of	 tariffs	mainly	
means	that	the	transfer	of	income	from	the	consumer	to	the	state	is	reversed.	While	tariffs,	besides	
having	this	distribution	effect,	also	cause	a	loss	of	welfare,	the	loss	is	very	low	when	the	tariffs	are	
as	low	as	they	are	in	this	case.8	
8	 See	Felbermayr,	Jung	and	Larch	(2013).
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In	order	to	distinguish	our	approach	from	other	studies,	look	at	Figure	2.	This	shows	through	the	
blank	areas	in	which	trade	categories	the	transatlantic	agreement	will	lead	to	a	reduction	of	trade	
costs.
First,	 the	 import	 tariffs	 applied	between	 the	EU	and	USA	will	 disappear,	 just	 like	 in	 the	 tariff	
scenario.	How	can	the	change	in	non-tariff	barriers	be	modeled?	There	is	a	problem	with	this	in	
the	scientific	literature,	because	the	definition	and	quantification	of	non-tariff	barriers	continues	
to	be	disputed.9	One	particular	circumstance	creates	special	difficulties:	Even	when	it	is	possible	
to	clearly	distinguish	non-tariff	barriers	from	tariff	barriers,	it	remains	unclear	which	components	
of	the	non-tariff	barriers	can	in	fact	be	influenced	by	free-trade	agreements.	In	this	context,	the	
literature	speaks	of	“actionability”	and	seeks	to	 identify	those	which,	 in	the	 jungle	of	 the	most	
varied	trade	policy	measures,	can	be	changed	in	some	circumstances.	There	is	no	systematic	and	
generally	recognized	way	of	doing	that.	In	a	second	step,	there	must	be	a	way	of	clarifying	the	
extent	to	which	a	free-trade	agreement	could	lower	the	non-tariff	barriers.	There	is	no	recognized	
method	of	estimation	for	this	either;	the	studies	use	estimates	by	experts.
Our	approach	is	different	and	avoids	all	speculation.	From	the	gravitation	equation	that	we	are	
already	using	to	quantify	the	trade	cost	matrix,	we	obtain	an	econometric	estimate	for	the	trade	
creation	 effects	 of	 existing	 free-trade	 agreements,	 such	 as	 the	 European	 Union	 or	 the	 North	
American	 Free-trade	 agreement	 (NAFTA).	 For	 all	 sectors	 and	 on	 average	 for	 all	 participating	
countries,	the	data	show	that	the	existing	agreements	increase	trade	in	aggregate	by	about	80%.10	
This	number	reflects	the	status	quo	of	2007,	but	is	stable	over	time.	It	reflects	the	fact	that	trade	
agreements	are	not	reached	between	random	pairs	of	countries	or	regions.	Instead,	the	probability	
of	having	an	agreement	is	higher	if	there	is	already	a	relatively	large	amount	of	trade	between	a	
country	pair.11	In	addition,	it	considers	third-country	effects,	as	well	as	trade	creation	that	results	
indirectly	from	a	change	in	the	GDPs	of	all	countries.
9	 See	Anderson	et	al.	(2008).
10	 	This	 value	 deviates	 from	 the	 one	 used	 in	 the	 industry	 analysis.	 That	 is	 due	 to	 the	 choice	 of	 a	 larger	 aggregation	 level	 for	
macroeconomic	consideration	 (the	aggregate	value	 is	not	 the	same	as	 the	average	of	 the	 industry	values)	and	 is	based	on	a	
different	econometric	strategy	(solving	the	“endogeneity	problem”).
11	 	It	is	possible	that	agreements	are	only	signed	if	trade	stimulation	between	two	countries	is	expected	for	reasons	that	have	nothing	
to	do	with	trade	policy	(e.g.,	economic	growth).	In	that	case,	a	positive	correlation	would	exist	between	the	trade	volume	and	
the	presence	of	an	agreement,	but	it	should	not	be	interpreted	as	a	causal	relationship.	In	this	context,	it	is	termed	a	“spurious”	
correlation.
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The	econometric	estimate	not	only	allows	accurate	parameterization	of	a	base	equilibrium	for	a	
large	number	of	countries,	it	also	offers	a	reasonable	scenario.	The	trade	creation	of	80%	by	already	
existing	deep	agreements	just	mentioned	in	our	view	also	represents	a	realistic	order	of	magnitude	
for	 the	aggregate	effect	of	a	 transatlantic	 free-trade	agreement.	 It	 can	again	be	concluded	 that	
mere	elimination	of	the	remaining	tariffs	between	the	EU	and	the	USA	would	never	suffice	to	bring	
about	 trade	creation	of	 this	magnitude.	 Instead,	 the	 figures	show	that	 the	 lion’s	share	of	 trade	
creation	must	come	from	lowering	non-tariff	barriers.	
This	can	be	understood	using	a	simple	example:	In	the	gravitation	model,	there	is	a	partial	analytic	
multiplier	connection	between	the	change	in	bilateral	trade	and	the	change	in	all	variable	trade	
costs,	in	which	the	multiplier	is	the	elasticity	of	trade.	If	trade	then	increases	by	80%	and	trade	
elasticity	is	5,12	then	trade	costs	must	have	fallen	by	80%	:	5	=	16%.	The	tariffs	outside	the	free-
trade	 agreement	 amount	 to	 3.5%.	 That	means	 that	 the	 non-tariff	 barriers	must	 have	 fallen	 by	
16%	–	3.5%	=	12.5%.
While	this	example	is	naturally	highly	simplified,	it	nevertheless	makes	clear	that	our	approach	
requires	no	determination	of	the	“actionability“	of	barriers	and	no	speculation	on	the	scale	of	cost	
reductions.	Instead,	we	assume	that	TTIP	will	have	approximately	the	same	effects	on	trade	costs	
that	other	free-trade	agreements	have	had.	In	that	way,	those	effects	that	are	especially	difficult	
to	quantify	are	also	taken	into	account,	reflected	under	the	heading	“other	policies.”	Moreover,	
our	 scenario	 definition	 reflects	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 stimulation	 of	 trade	 by	 reducing	 trade	 policy	
12	 Anderson	and	van	Wincoop	(2004)	provide	an	overview	of	estimates	of	trade	elasticity.
Source: Schematic representation by ifo Institut
Figure 2: Change in trade costs from TTIP
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barriers	 leads	 to	 secondary	 and	 tertiary	 effects	 from	 greater	 public	 and	 private	 investment	 in	
further	improvements	in	trade	infrastructure.
The	average	trade-creating	effect	of	free-trade	agreements	in	our	study	is	measured	at	about	80%.	
This	is	substantially	higher	than	calculated	in	other	studies.13	The	difference	is	due	mainly	to	the	
different	scenario	definition:	Because	we	base	our	deep	liberalization	scenario	on	the	measured	
effects	in	real	data,	our	results	are	higher.	Two	other	differences	are	also	important,	however:	First,	
the	focus	on	trade	costs	allows	us	to	reproduce	the	status	quo	of	the	initial	equilibrium	with	a	very	
terse	formulation	of	the	demand	side	of	the	model.	But	because	trade	cost	changes	contribute	in	
a	non-linear	way	to	changes	in	trade	flows,	our	model	is	more	reactive	than	others	that	achieve	
the	resulting	equilibrium	by	fixing	consumption	weights	specific	to	each	country.14	Second,	our	
approach	makes	it	possible	to	actually	include	126	countries	in	the	analysis.	That	means	that	we	
don’t	have	to	perform	any	regional	aggregations	that	assume	a	frictionless	exchange	of	goods.	For	
example,	trade	within	the	EU	is	affected	by	trade	costs	in	our	method,	which	reflects	reality.	This	
also	results	in	a	strong	reaction	by	the	models	to	transatlantic	trade	liberalization.
In	all	scenarios,	we	adopt	the	following	thought	experiment.	We	know	the	world	as	it	is	represented	
in	the	initial	equilibrium	in	the	data.	Now	we	adapt	the	trade	flows	in	such	a	way	that	the	trade	
costs	between	the	EU	states	and	the	USA	decrease	to	the	extent	that	the	trade	gain	so	induced	
between	 the	 participating	 countries	 corresponds	 to	 the	 empirically	measured	 effect	 of	 already	
existing	agreements.	Because	 these	agreements	have	existed	on	average	 for	quite	a	while,	our	
approach	results	in	the	simulated	effects	of	TTIP	reflecting	the	complete	expression	of	all	direct	
and	indirect	effects.
In	the	simulation	model	used,	there	is	a	relatively	simple	connection	between	the	welfare	gains	of	
a	country	from	the	new	agreement,	the	changes	in	a	country’s	openness	in	general	and	so-called	
trade	elasticity.	The	model	follows	current	research	in	doing	this.15	To	summarize,	it	can	be	said	
that	the	greater	the	trade-creating	effect	of	an	agreement,	the	more	real	per	capita	income	rises;	
the	greater	 the	 trade	elasticity,	 the	more	 the	new	relative	capacity	 for	competing	on	price	will	
change	trade	flows	but	the	lower	the	per	capita	income	gains	will	be.	The	level	of	trade	elasticity	
actually	reflects	how	easily	the	goods	of	different	countries	can	be	substituted	for	each	other.	The	
easier	the	substitution,	the	less	“valuable”	international	trade	will	be.	
	
13	 Cf.	note	2.
14	 	Using	such	weighting,	the	traditional	models	represent	the	trade	flows	observed.	In	our	approach,	this	is	achieved	by	the	trade	
cost	matrix.
15	 	Arkolakis	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 present	 a	 simple	 formula	 that	 can	be	used	 to	 quantify	 the	 trade	 gains	 and	has	minimal	 information	
requirements.
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4.  Where does trade grow, where does it shrink and 
by how much?
TTIP	will	lead	to	a	noticeable	change	in	global	trade	structure.	We	assume	in	our	ambitious	scenario	
that	trade	between	the	USA	and	the	EU	member	states	increases	on	average	exactly	to	the	extent	
we	have	measured	in	the	data	on	comparable	existing	agreements.	
The	 intertwining	 of	 countries	 through	 trade	 is	 an	 important	 indicator	 of	 cooperation,	 not	 only	
in	 trade	 policy	 but	 also	 in	many	 other	 political	 areas.	 For	 example,	 a	weakening	 of	 the	 trade	
relationships	among	EU	member	states	could	be	considered	critical	because	it	could	diminish	the	
interest	of	individual	countries	in	the	European	unification	project.
4.1 Effects on German foreign trade
Table	1	shows	the	calculated	rates	of	change	of	bilateral	 trade	volumes	and	 its	most	 important	
trading	partners	in	Europe	and	the	world.	The	figures	indicate	how	trade	volumes	would	appear	
in	comparison	with	actually	observed	volumes	if	there	had	already	been	an	agreement	between	
the	EU	and	USA	 in	2010.	We	 are	 thus	 comparing	 the	 factual,	 observed	 reality	 of	 2010	with	 a	
counterfactual	reality	 in	which	we	assume	that	 the	agreement	already	existed.	By	doing	so	we	
avoid	having	to	propose	forecasts	of	future	trade	volumes	(i.e.,	quantities	and	prices),	which	would	
be	associated	with	forecasting	errors.	And	we	avoid	modeling	specific	phase-in	paths,	since	doing	
so	would	also	be	extremely	speculative.
The	first	line	of	Table	1	shows	that	in	the	tariff	scenario,	German	exports	to	the	USA	would	rise	
by	1.13%	and	imports	by	1.65%.	That	means	that	Germany’s	trade	surplus	of	about	USD	30	billion	
would	decline	slightly.	Looking	at	the	deep	liberalization	scenario	 instead,	exports	and	imports	
show	very	similar	adaptations	that	in	each	case	are	more	than	90%.	We	find	as	a	result	a	strong	
increase	in	trade	flows	between	Germany	and	the	USA.	This	strong	growth	should	be	understood	
in	the	context	of	the	assumed	scenarios.	As	explained	above,	it	includes	both	the	elimination	of	
tariffs	and	the	reduction	of	non-tariff	barriers	that	can	be	directly	influenced	by	policy	as	well	as	
those	which	result	from	the	effects	of	lowering	political	barriers	on	other	trade-creating	variables,	
such	as	direct	investments.	
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The	Germany-USA	example	shows	quite	clearly	that	an	agreement	that	results	only	in	lowering	
tariffs	cannot	trigger	any	significant	trade-creating	effects.	On	the	other	hand,	a	comprehensive	
and	deep	agreement	has	much	stronger	effects.
Table	 1	 also	 shows	 very	 forcefully	 that	Germany’s	 trade	with	 its	 other	 trading	 partners	 could	
decline	 sharply	 in	 some	areas.	 The	portents	 of	 these	 trade	 effects	 are	 consistently	negative	 in	
both	the	tariff	and	comprehensive	liberalization	scenarios.	In	principle,	TTIP	would	significantly	
alter	the	trade	diversion	effects	currently	in	force	in	the	EU.	Such	alterations	occurred	in	the	past	
because	trade	among	the	EU	countries	themselves	is	barrier-free,	while	trade	by	the	EU	countries	
with	the	USA	is	subject	to	both	tariff	and	non-tariff	barriers.	The	leveling	of	the	barriers	with	the	
USA	thus	leads	to	a	decline	in	trade	that	came	about	as	a	result	of	preferential	treatment	of	intra-
European	trade	flows.	This	is	most	true	for	Great	Britain,	which	has	relatively	low	natural	trade	
barriers	(language,	culture)	with	the	USA,	so	that	 lowering	policy	friction	leads	to	strong	trade	
creation	and	diversion.
Interestingly,	 TTIP	 leads	 to	 an	 expansion	 of	 Germany’s	 exports	 to	 Japan,	 and	 does	 so	 in	 both	
assumed	scenarios.	This	 is	 related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	competitiveness	of	German	exporters	 is	
increased	by	the	availability	of	cheaper	intermediate	products	from	the	USA.	Moreover,	there	is	a	
reduction	of	competitive	pressure	on	the	Japanese	market	because	its	exports	go	back	to	the	USA.	
The	effect	on	Germany’s	trade	with	China	is	negative,	however,	at	least	in	the	deep	liberalization	
scenario.	A	decline	in	both	exports	and	imports	of	about	13%	is	to	be	expected	in	each	case.
Table 1: Change in German foreign trade with traditional partner countries
Exporter Importer 2010* Trade volumes  
(in USD millions)
Comprehensive  
liberalization %
Tariff scenario %
GER USA 83,553 93.54 1.13
USA GER 51,645 93.56 1.65
GER GBR 72,052 –40.91 –0.70
GBR GER 43,583 –40.93 –0.57
GER FRA 109,223 –23.34 –0.38
FRA GER 76,518 –23.34 –0.24
GER ITA 74,245 –29.45 –0.37
ITA GER 52,687 –29.45 –0.55
GER JPN 17,487 4.81 2.40
JPN GER 24,891 4.76 –1.68
GER CHN 67,728 –12.68 2.19
CHN GER 92,536 –12.71 –2.94
GER = Germany, GBR = Great Britain, FRA = France, ITA = Italy, JPN = Japan, CHN = China.
Source: ifo Institut
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Next	we	examine	German	foreign	trade	with	the	GIIPS	countries	(Greece,	Ireland,	Italy,	Portugal	
and	Spain).	This	is	of	interest,	given	the	current	crisis	in	the	European	Union.	The	data	in	Table	
2	confirm	what	was	already	evident	in	Table	1:	the	GIIPS	countries	are	no	exception	–	their	trade	
with	Germany	will	drop	due	to	TTIP.	The	effects	are	very	small,	if	you	look	at	the	tariff	scenario,	
but	are	substantial	if	the	more	ambitious	scenario	is	assumed.
Finally,	we	consider	the	change	in	Germany’s	trade	with	the	BRICS	countries	(Brazil,	Russia,	India,	
China,	South	Africa).	As	shown	 in	Table	3,	 the	elimination	of	 tariffs	between	 the	EU	and	USA	
causes	Germany’s	exports	to	the	BRICS	generally	to	rise	slightly.	The	reason	lies	in	the	increased	
price	competitiveness	of	Germany	due	to	cheaper	imports	of	intermediate	products	from	the	USA.	
Imports	from	the	BRICS,	on	the	other	hand,	decline	because	the	competitive	pressure	in	Germany	
increases	from	the	intensified	presence	of	American	companies.	If	a	deep	liberalization	scenario	
is	assumed,	both	exports	and	 imports	undergo	 increased	 trade	diversion:	German	exports	 that	
previously	went	to	the	BRICS	now	go	to	the	USA;	and	Germany	replaces	imports	from	the	BRICS	
with	imports	from	the	USA.	This	occurs	even	though	the	trade	barriers	with	the	BRICS	have	not	
changed	nominally.	Trade	diversion	is	driven	solely	by	the	change	in	relative	trade	costs.
Table 2: Changes in German foreign trade with the Peripheral EU (GIIPS)
Exporter Importer 2010* Trade volumes  
(in USD millions)
Comprehensive  
liberalization %
Tariff scenario %
GER GRC 6,655 –29.94 –0.14
GRC GER 2,322 –29.93 –0.95
GER IRL 5,195 –34.87 –0.64
IRL GER 10,662 –34.85 –0.16
GER ITA 74,245 –29.45 –0.37
ITA GER 52,687 –29.45 –0.55
GER PRT 10,306 –29.90 –0.31
PRT GER 5,385 –29.88 –0.55
GER ESP 39,590 –33.71 –0.47
ESP GER 26,142 –33.71 –0.57
GER GIIPS 135,991 –30.96 –0.39
GIIPS GER 97,197 –31.22 –0.52
GER = Germany, GRC = Greece, IRL = Ireland, ITA = Italy, PRT = Portugal, ESP = Spain, GIIPS = Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain.
Source: ifo Institut
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4.2. Effects on EU trade 
Next,	we	 look	 at	 the	 change	 in	 EU	 trade	with	 countries	 in	 their	 geographic	 vicinity.	We	 look	
especially	at	the	countries	of	the	Maghreb,	with	which	the	EU	has	a	free-trade	agreement	(Euro-
Mediterranean	Agreement),	and	the	two	successor	states	to	the	Soviet	Union	for	which	we	have	
data	(Russia	and	Belarus).
Table	 4	 shows	 that	 in	 the	 tariff	 scenario,	 EU	 exports	 to	 the	 countries	 bordering	 on	 the	
Mediterranean	(Morocco,	Tunisia,	Algeria	and	Egypt)	or	the	successor	states	to	the	Soviet	Union	
would	 increase,	 while	 imports	 from	 these	 countries	 would	 decrease.	 This	 in	 turn	 reflects	 the	
increased	competitiveness	of	European	companies.	If	the	comprehensive	liberalization	scenario	
is	considered,	however,	traditional	trade	diversion	effects	predominate:	EU	exports	to	and	imports	
from	the	Maghreb	countries	or	Eastern	Europe	decline.	Given	the	massive	drop	in	barriers	between	
the	EU	and	USA	in	our	scenario,	the	effects	are	not	easily	predictable.	
Table 3: Change in German foreign trade with the BRICS countries
Exporter Importer 2010* Trade volumes  
(in USD millions)
Comprehensive  
liberalization %
Tariff scenario %
GER BRA 12,951 –7.58 2.41
BRA GER 8,844 –7.92 –3.67
GER RUS 32,512 –7.51 1.64
RUS GER 20,362 –7.17 –1.20
GER IND 10,866 –8.96 2.36
IND GER 7,859 –9.26 –2.30
GER CHN 67,728 –12.68 2.19
CHN GER 92,536 –12.71 –2.94
GER SAF 8,274 –3.96 1.24
SAF GER 6,719 –3.73 –1.20
GER BRICS 132,331 –10.06 2.03
BRICS GER 136,320 –10.93 –2.61
GER = Germany, BRA = Brazil, CHN = China, RUS = Russia, IND = India, SAF = South Africa, BRICS = Brazil, Russia,  
India, China, South Africa.
Source: ifo Institut
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We	then	show	that	trade	by	the	GIIPS	states	with	the	USA	increases	sharply	in	all	cases.	Table	5	
shows	that	this	is	especially	true	with	comprehensive	liberalization.	The	growth	rates,	with	the	
exception	of	Ireland	where	transatlantic	trade	is	already	highly	developed,	are	on	the	same	scale	
as	for	the	bilateral	relationship	of	the	USA	with	Germany.
Table 4: Changes in EU trade with EU neighboring countries
Exporter Importer 2010* Trade volumes  
(in USD millions)
Comprehensive  
liberalization %
Tariff scenario %
EU MAR 18,028 –5.14 0.94
MAR EU 11,775 –5.39 –0.38
EU TUN 14,818 –4.75 1.33
TUN EU 13,287 –4.41 –0.82
EU DZA 21,656 –4.33 4.11
DZA EU 28,641 –0.98 –0.98
EU EGY 19,851 –5.81 1.35
EGY EU 10,584 –7.67 –0.15
EU RUS 109,586 –7.83 1.57
RUS EU 195,846 –7.75 –1.15
EU BLR 8,641 –5.91 2.59
BLR EU 7,662 –14.34 –0.42
EU = European Union, MAR = Morocco, TUN = Tunisia, DZA = Algeria, EGY = Egypt, RUS = Russia, BLR = Belarus.
Source: ifo Institut
Table 5: Change in trade of GIIPS countries with the USA
Exporter Importer 2010* Trade volumes (in 
USD millions)
Comprehensive liberali-
zation %
Tariff scenario %
USA GRC 1,559 90.43 1.95
GRC USA 917 90.45 0.60
USA IRL 8,022 77.03 1.44
IRL USA 28,424 77.06 1.40
USA ITA 13,254 91.77 1.71
ITA USA 28,151 91.75 1.00
USA PRT 1,068 90.56 1.78
PRT USA 2,053 90.59 1.01
USA ESP 11,575 80.18 1.62
ESP USA 8,724 80.16 0.99
GRC = Greece, IRL = Ireland, ITA = Italy, PRT = Portugal, ESP = Spain.
Source: ifo Institut
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Finally,	 we	 examine	 the	 change	 in	 the	 trade	 relationships	 of	 Great	 Britain.	 This	 is	 of	 special	
interest	because	Great	Britain,	unlike	other	members	of	the	European	Union,	already	has	a	very	
high	degree	of	economic	integration	with	the	USA,	and	the	new	definition	of	Great	Britain’s	role	in	
the	EU	is	often	discussed	with	reference	to	its	strong	relationships	with	the	USA.
Table	6	shows	that	in	the	case	of	a	transatlantic	agreement,	both	exports	to	the	USA	and	imports	by	
Great	Britain	from	the	USA	would	grow	sharply.	This	is	especially	evident	for	the	comprehensive	
liberalization	 scenario.	 Trade	 with	 Canada	 would	 be	 only	 slightly	 affected.	 In	 comparison,	 it	
appears	that	integration	of	Great	Britain	in	the	EU	would	be	noticeably	weaker	in	some	areas.	In	
other	words,	through	the	transatlantic	agreement,	having	Great	Britain	remain	in	the	European	
Customs	Union	would	be	 less	valuable	 for	both	Great	Britain	and	the	other	EU	member	states.	
Given	this	background,	the	discussion	of	Great	Britain’s	exit	from	the	EU	could	take	on	additional	
energy.
Table 6: Change in Great Britain’s trading relationships
Exporter Importer 2010* Trade volumes  
(in USD millions)
Comprehensive  
liberalization %
Tariff scenario %
GBR USA 49,347 60.56 0.98 
USA GBR 42,184 60.61 1.38 
GBR CAN 9,400 –1.45 2.67 
CAN GBR 15,929 –1.41 –0.15 
GBR GER 43,583 –40.93 –0.57 
GER GBR 72,052 –40.91 –0.70 
GBR FRA 26,610 –36.41 –0.52 
FRA GBR 34,002  –36.39 –0.52
GBR ITA 15,268 –41.47 –0.51 
ITA GBR 23,191 –41.46 –0.82 
GBR ESP 13,710 –45.01 –0.61 
ESP GBR 15,690 –45.00 –0.84 
GBR IRL 21,788 –45.97 –0.78 
IRL GBR 19,420 –45.94 –0.43 
GBR JPN 6,277 –13.05 2.25
JPN GBR 13,243  –13.07 –1.95 
GBR CHN 9,545 –27.56 2.04 
CHN GBR 48,619 –27.57 –3.21
GBR = Great Britain, CAN = Canada, GER = Germany, FRA = France, ITA = Italy, ESP = Spain, IRL = Ireland,  
JPN = Japan, CHN = China.
Source: ifo Institut
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4.3. Effects in North America
Table	7	examines	the	changes	in	trade	in	North	America	and	between	the	USA	and	the	BRICS.	A	
few	important	insights	are	striking.	First,	TTIP	leads	to	trade	diversion	effects	within	the	North	
American	Free	Trade	Area	 (NAFTA)	 between	USA,	Mexico	 and	Canada.	 In	 the	 comprehensive	
liberalization	scenario,	both	exports	and	imports	decline	for	NAFTA	partner	countries	within	the	
region.	The	two	NAFTA	countries	whose	position	is	not	improved	by	TTIP,	Mexico	and	Canada,	
intensify	their	trade.	That	is	an	impressive	example	of	trade	diversion	effects	between	countries	
not	directly	affected	in	any	way	by	TTIP:	The	access	of	these	countries	especially	to	the	US	market	
becomes	less	attractive	due	to	 increased	competition	from	the	EU,	 leading	to	a	substantial	rise	
in	trade	between	them.	What	makes	this	effect	so	strong	is	that	the	trade	barriers,	as	we	know,	
between	Mexico	and	Canada	have	already	been	eliminated.
Interestingly,	 TTIP	 leads	 to	 an	 expansion	 of	 trade	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 Canada.	 Geographic	
circumstances	are	decisive	for	this	result.	Because	of	its	closeness	to	the	USA,	Canada	is	especially	
affected	 by	 trade	 diversion	 effects	 involving	 the	USA.	 This	 effect	 leads	 to	 creating	 trade	with	
the	EU	countries	that	are	geographically	farther	away,	so	that	transport	costs	are	lower,	and	the	
change	in	the	relative	cost	structures	leads	to	replacement	of	the	American	market	with	the	EU.	
This	circumstance	means	that	finalization	of	an	agreement	between	the	EU	and	Canada,	currently	
under	negotiation,	would	strengthen	the	trade	of	the	countries	involved	with	each	other	but	not	
eliminate	the	negative	trade	diversion	effects.	
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Table 7: Change in trade between USA and Canada
Exporter Importer 2010* Trade volumes  
(in USD millions)
Comprehensive  
liberalization %
Tariff scenario %
EU CAN 43,565 14.53 2.82
CAN EU 34,965 10.07 0.00
USA MEX 142,763 –15.99 –0.82
MEX USA 221,803 –16.04 1.33
USA CAN 193,554 –9.32 –0.55
CAN USA 271,268 –9.32 1.61
MEX CAN 18,965 83.53 3.10
CAN MEX 6,692 83.63 3.11
USA BRA 26,762 –29.45 –0.95
BRA USA 20,116 –29.72 –2.24
USA RUS 7,878 –29.40 –1.69
RUS USA 16,674 –29.16 0.28
USA IND 15,174 –30.51 –0.99
IND USA 29,214 –30.75 –0.84
USA CHN 83,873 –33.35 –1.16
CHN USA 327,554 –33.38 –1.50
USA SAF 5,993 –26.69 –2.07
SAF USA 8,331 –26.53 0.27
USA BRICS 139,681 –31.78 –1.17
BRICS USA 401,889 –32.69 –1.38
EU = European Union, CAN = Canada, MEX = Mexico, BRA = Brazil, RUS = Russia, IND = India, CHN = China,  
SAF = South Africa.
Source: ifo Institut
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5. How do real per capita incomes change?
The	TTIP	effects	on	trade	flows	presented	thus	far	essentially	result,	as	has	already	been	pointed	
out	above,	from	the	adaptation	of	trade	costs	and	the	resulting	change	in	production	costs,	input	
prices	and	income	positions	of	the	countries.	
5.1 Effects in the EU
What	are	the	effects	of	eliminating	the	transatlantic	trade	barriers	on	real	per	capita	income	in	the	
EU?	Does	TTIP	result	in	greater	discrepancies	in	living	conditions	in	Europe	or	does	it	promote	
convergence?	To	answer	this	question,	we	first	look	at	the	unambitious	tariff	scenario	and	then	
describe	the	effects	of	deep	liberalization.
Tariff scenario 
The	model	simulations	now	show	that	a	transatlantic	free-trade	agreement	would	not	contribute	
to	causing	greater	divergence	in	living	conditions	in	Europe.	In	fact,	the	opposite	is	more	likely.	
Figure	3	shows	the	change	in	real	per	capita	income	(which	is	identical	to	real	GDP	per	capita)	in	
all	EU	member	countries	if	tariffs	between	the	EU	and	the	USA	are	entirely	eliminated.
The	change	in	real	per	capita	income	ranges	between	0.03%	(Luxemburg)	and	0.58%	(Lithuania).	
For	Germany,	 the	 value	 is	 0.24%.	 In	 the	 non-weighted	EU27	mean,	 the	 gain	 is	 0.27%	 and	 the	
standard	deviation	is	0.13%.	These	effects	are	small	because	the	tariffs	that	still	exist	between	the	
EU	and	USA	are	already	low	(the	weighted	average	is	2.8%).
The	illustration	above	makes	the	following	points	clear:	First,	all	member	countries	of	the	EU	benefit	
from	trade	liberalization.	In	the	tariff	scenario,	that	was	not	necessarily	the	case	because	the	EU	had	
to	give	up	tariff	revenues.	That	means,	in	the	tariff	scenario,	less	income	is	available	for	distribution.16	
Second,	how	much	economies	benefit	depends	on	the	real	trade	structure	of	the	individual	countries,	
their	size	and	their	geographical	position.	Those	that	export	a	relatively	large	amount	obtain	relatively	
higher	gains.	This	accounts	for	the	somewhat	higher	benefits	in	Great	Britain,	for	example.	Higher	
incomes	in	these	countries	again	result	in	increased	demand	for	goods	from	other	countries	in	the	
EU.	How	these	effects	are	distributed	in	Europe	depends	essentially	on	inner	European	transport	
routes	and	 thus	 the	geographical	 location	of	 the	countries.	Finally,	 it	 also	 turns	out	 that	 smaller	
countries	tend	to	gain	more	than	large	ones.	The	example	of	the	Baltic	countries	is	especially	telling	
in	this	regard.	Smaller	countries	are	more	involved	in	the	international	division	of	labor	and	therefore	
gain	more	from	lower	trade	costs.	The	effects	illustrated	include	these	aspects.
16	 	It	is	assumed	that	the	tariffs	revenue	of	the	EU	is	distributed	uniformly	to	all	EU	countries.	That	is	not	actually	the	case,	but	all	
tariff	revenues	from	trade	with	the	USA	account	for	less	than	0.1%	of	EU	GDP	so	that	a	substantial	distortion	of	the	result	is	not	
likely.
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Figure	4	correlates	per	capita	growth	with	the	 level	of	real	per	capita	GDP	for	2011.	The	cloud	
diagram	shows	a	negative	correlation	that	is	also	confirmed	by	statistical	analysis.	The	red	line	
is	a	linear	regression	equation.	It	can	be	read	as	follows:	the	log	of	French	per	capita	income	is	
about	 10.5.	 The	 statistical	model	 forecasts	 an	 increase	 in	 real	 per	 capita	GDP	 for	 this	 country	
of	0.23%	(which	is	higher	than	the	specific	calculations	for	France	or	0.17%;	i.e.,	France	profits	
below	average).	For	a	country	with	a	50%	lower	per	capita	income	than	France	(such	as	Poland	
or	Hungary,	for	example,	where	the	log	of	per	capita	income	is	about	10.0),	the	statistical	model	
forecasts	 growth	 of	 0.33%.17	 This	 shows	 that	 the	 transatlantic	 agreement	 would	 contribute	 to	
convergence	in	Europe:	Countries	that	currently	have	a	lower	per	capita	income	(such	as	Romania)	
gain	more	than	those	that	have	higher	incomes	(such	as	Luxembourg).	There	is	a	large	degree	of	
scatter	but	the	statistical	finding	is	unambiguous.
17	 	The	coefficient	of	the	log	of	per	capita	income	for	2011	in	the	regression	equation	is	–0.21;	the	relevant	standard	deviation	is	
–0.05.	Thus	the	correlation	is	statistically	significant	at	the	1%	level.	This	finding	does	not	depend	on	the	data	weighting.
Source: ifo Institut
Figure 3: Change in real per capita income in the EU27, tariff scenario
0.00–0.20 0.21–0.50 0.51–1.70
0.17
0.24
0.31
0.31
0.22
0.27
0.11
0.16
0.19
0.28
0.12
0.17
0.15
0.17
0.26
0.38
0.23
0.37
0.24
0.30
0.30
0.58
0.49
0.50
0.40
0.33
0,03
23
How do real per capita incomes change?
Deep liberalization 
If	we	move	from	the	tariff	scenario	to	an	ambitious	scenario	that	besides	eliminating	tariffs,	also	
includes	a	 reduction	of	non-tariff	 barriers,	 the	 resulting	picture	 is	different.	As	also	explained	
above,	it	is	important	to	realize	here	that	the	deep	scenario,	in	addition	to	trade-policy	liberalization	
steps,	also	includes	induced	effects	(e.g.,	from	the	expansion	of	direct	investments	or	the	reduction	
of	economic	policy	uncertainty).
Source: Caculations: ifo Institut
Figure 4: Trade gains and status quo per capita income, tariff scenario
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Figure	5	reproduces	Figure	1	for	the	case	of	a	deep	agreement.	On	average,	the	gains	are	some	
23	times	higher	than	in	the	tariff	scenario.	Most	striking	is	the	deviation	in	Luxembourg,	which	
profits	a	great	deal	 from	increased	trading	by	its	European	trading	partners	with	USA	without	
having	large	trade	flows	with	America	itself.	Germany	also	shows	gains	that	are	20	times	higher	
than	in	the	tariff	scenario.	The	European	average	gain	is	4.95%	with	a	standard	deviation	of	1.58%.	
One	country	that	benefits	relatively	little	is	France	(2.64%).	The	reason	is	that	France	has	relatively	
little	trade	in	goods	with	the	USA.	Even	so,	the	gains	are	in	the	clearly	visible	range.
The	countries	that	profit	most	are	generally	those	that	already	have	high	relative	trade	volumes	
with	 the	 USA.	 This	 explains	 the	 large	 gain	 by	 Great	 Britain.	 The	 Scandinavian	 countries	 and	
Spain	also	get	above	average	gains.	However,	in	the	latter	instance,	it	is	due	to	the	fact	that	Spain	
replaces	relatively	expensive	European	imports	with	imports	from	the	USA,	which	has	a	welfare-
increasing	effect.
Source: ifo Institut
Figure 5: Change in real per capita income in the EU27, 
deep liberalization
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Figure	5	suggests	that	above	all,	the	smaller	peripheral	countries	obtain	above	average	gains	from	
trade	liberalization.	The	reason	for	this	is	the	same	as	in	the	tariff	scenario.	However,	with	the	non-
tariff	barriers	eliminated,	the	stimulation	of	inner-European	demand	from	supplier	relationships	
with	large	countries	that	obtain	relatively	strong	benefits	plays	a	substantially	larger	role.
Figure	6	again	correlates	the	projected	growth	in	per	capita	income	with	its	current	level.	Again,	
the	 correlation	 is	 negative.	 The	minus	 sign	 is	 driven	 entirely	 by	 Luxembourg,	 however.	With	
or	without	 Luxembourg,	 no	 statistically	 significant	 connection	 between	 the	 two	 values	 can	 be	
demonstrated.18
18	 	The	regression	coefficient	of	the	log	of	per	capita	income	in	2011	amounts	to	–0.80	for	a	standard	deviation	of	the	same	size.
Source: Calculations: ifo Institut.
Figure 6: Trade gains and Status Quo per capita income, deep 
liberalization 
SVK
AUT
FIN
EST
LUX
MLT
PRT
BEL
BGR
CYP
CZE
DNK
HUN
POL
ROM
GBR
SWE
NLD
ESP
SVN
DEU
GRCLTU
IRL
ITA
LVA
FRA
9,5 10,0 10,5 11,0 11,5
2
4
6
8
10
Basisjahr 2011; 
Line shows linear regression.
tr
ad
in
g 
pr
of
it 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
logarithmical per capita income
26
How do real per capita incomes change?
Conclusion
It	can	be	concluded	that	the	transatlantic	free	trade	initiative	does	not	expand	the	income	gap	
within	 Europe.	 The	 modest	 tariff	 scenario	 actually	 shows	 that	 the	 agreement	 leads	 to	 more	
convergence:	i.e.,	the	poorer,	often	peripheral	countries	profit	more	than	the	richer,	central	ones.	
However,	in	such	a	scenario,	the	average	gains	from	the	agreement	are	low.	An	agreement	that	
also	significantly	lowers	non-tariff	barriers	leads	to	much	higher	welfare	gains.	Also	in	this	case,	
there	is	a	negative	correlation	between	the	status	quo	income	of	EU	members	and	their	gains,	so	
that	additional	convergence	results.	However,	the	correlation	here	is	not	a	reliable	one	under	the	
usual	statistical	assumptions.
5.2 Effects on the USA and third countries 
One	central	point	of	criticism	in	the	debate	about	any	free-trade	agreement	involves	its	effect	
on	third	countries.	 If	a	 few	countries	 tear	down	the	trade	barriers	among	them	but	maintain	
tariff	and	non-tariff	barriers	against	countries	outside	the	agreement,	there	is	trade	creation	that	
supports	welfare	among	the	partners	but	at	the	same	time,	trade	with	third	parties	is	diverted.	
In	the	tariff	scenario,	it	can	in	theory	actually	lead	to	the	partner	countries	obtaining	absolutely	
no	benefit	 from	the	agreement:	The	 lost	 tariff	 income	 is	 larger	 (in	monetary	 terms)	 than	 the	
advantages	of	improved	market	access.	And	typically,	those	countries	that	do	not	participate	in	
the	agreement	lose.	In	fact,	it	is	even	theoretically	possible	for	real	global	total	income	to	fall,	
if	the	gains	obtained	by	participants	in	the	agreement	are	smaller	than	the	losses	of	those	who	
remain	outside.
The	effects	of	lower	non-tariff	barriers	are	different	than	those	of	lower	tariffs.	There	are	several	
reasons	 for	 this:	 Tariffs	 distribute	 income	 —	 essentially	 from	 consumers	 to	 producers.	 Their	
harmful	 side	 effect	 is	 how	 they	 distort	 consumption	 and	 production	 decisions.	 This	 causes	
damage	to	the	economy	that	rises	to	the	square	of	the	tariffs,	but	when	the	tariffs	are	very	low	
(close	to	zero),	they	are	negligible.	Non-tariff	barriers	do	not	result	in	any	income	distribution;	
instead	 they	 generate	 direct	 economic	 costs.	 To	 make	 products	 fit	 for	 a	 foreign	 market,	
bureaucratic,	 regulatory	and	administrative	 rules	have	 to	be	 respected,	delays	occur	and	 the	
market	risk	rises.	These	costs	are	associated	with	the	use	of	resources	but	are	of	very	little	or	
no	use	to	the	consumer.	In	this	way,	even	very	small	non-tariff	barriers	reduce	the	purchasing	
power	of	consumers	and	thus	their	real	income.
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An	additional	difference	between	tariff	and	non-tariff	barriers	is	important	in	this	connection.	
Non-tariff	barriers	assume	various	forms,	but	one	important	way	to	liberalize	them	is	to	unify	
product	standards	or	allow	automatic	domestic	acceptance	of	products	that	are	allowed	for	use	
abroad.	That	can	also	assist	third	countries:	If	a	product	satisfies	the	standards	of	one	member	
country	in	a	free	trade	zone,	it	may	then	be	allowed	for	sale	in	all	countries	of	the	zone,	even	if	
it	comes	from	a	third	country.	With	the	adoption	of	standards,	third	countries	can	minimize	the	
trade	diversion	effects	that	are	harmful	to	them.
In	order	to	quantify	the	global	effects,	we	refer	to	the	model	used	in	the	previous	section.	This	
model	was	calibrated	and	simulated	for	126	countries,	so	that	 it	can	be	used	for	analyzing	the	
effects.	First	let	us	turn	to	the	tariff	scenario.
Tariff scenario 
Figure	7	shows	the	change	in	real	per	capita	income	in	all	countries	considered.	The	model	covers	
virtually	all	the	countries	of	the	world,	except	for	some	gaps	mainly	in	Africa.	Countries	that	profit	
from	the	transatlantic	agreement	are	shown	in	blue,	while	those	that	lose	from	it	are	shown	in	
beige.	One	country	colored	dark	blue	is	the	USA.	There,	real	per	capita	income	rises	by	0.8%	just	
from	lowering	tariffs.	Compared	to	other	countries,	the	total	trade	barriers	of	the	USA	are	relatively	
low.	That	is	due	to	language,	currency	and	a	general	policy	of	openness	to	foreign	trade,	and	the	
result	is	that	tariff	cuts	can	have	a	strong	positive	effect.
The	figure	shows	that	the	winners	in	the	free	trade	zone	are	essentially	limited	to	the	USA	and	
EU	member	states.	Other	than	those,	there	are	only	isolated	countries	in	which	the	average	real	
income	rises.	These	are	countries	that	benefit	disproportionately	from	additional	exports	because	
of	an	improved	economy	in	the	EU	or	USA.	Examples	are	Brazil,	Kazakhstan	and	Indonesia,	which	
are	important	suppliers	of	raw	materials	to	Europe	and	the	USA.	These	countries	produce	goods	
like	natural	gas	or	cotton	for	which	there	are	very	few	good	substitutes.	Interestingly,	the	gains	for	
Kazakhstan	or	Brazil	are	higher	than	the	average	real	income	gains	in	Europe.	That	shows	that	the	
complicated	international	interweaving	of	the	flow	of	goods	can	also	result	in	surprising	effects.	
Countries	like	Norway	or	Japan	see	no	noticeable	changes	in	their	per	capita	income.
28
How do real per capita incomes change?
The	main	losers	from	eliminating	tariffs	are	the	developing	countries.	They	experience	dramatic	
losses	in	market	share	from	intensified	competition	on	the	EU	or	US	markets.	Alternative	markets	
with	similar	market	potential	are	geographically	far	apart.	This	is	a	problem	especially	for	countries	
in	North	and	West	Africa,	which	traditionally	trade	intensively	with	Europe,	especially	France	and	
Belgium.	The	list	of	losers	is	led	by	Ivory	Coast	and	Guinea.	Their	exports	to	Europe	are	pushed	
out	by	goods	from	the	USA.	East	Africa	comes	out	a	little	better,	mainly	due	to	its	proximity	to	
other	large	markets	like	China	or	Australia/New	Zealand.	But	there	too,	significant	losses	can	be	
experienced	by	countries	such	as	Uganda	and	Tanzania.
Overall,	it	shows	what	was	to	be	feared:	If	tariffs	between	the	USA	and	EU	fall,	the	relative	barriers	
to	market	entry	faced	by	developing	countries	become	on	average	higher.	It	is	exactly	the	poorer	
countries	that	suffer,	some	of	them	to	a	remarkable	extent.	Europe	and	the	USA	would	have	to	
moderate	 these	negative	 effects	 through	 the	quick	 signing	 of	 a	 “Doha	 light”	 compromise.	 The	
resources	for	doing	so	are	already	available	in	principle:	Through	the	EU-USA	agreement,	despite	
losses	in	many	third	countries,	the	world	becomes	on	average	richer	by	some	0.1%.
Source: ifo Institut
Figure 7: Change in global real per capita income, tariff scenario 
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Deep liberalization 
Finally,	let	us	take	a	look	at	the	effects	of	deep	liberalization	between	the	EU	and	USA.	Its	trade-
creating	effects	are,	as	described	in	the	EU27	example,	several	orders	of	magnitude	greater	than	
those	created	only	by	eliminating	tariffs.	This	necessarily	means	that	the	trade	diversion	effects	
are	also	more	intense.	The	trend	is	for	countries	that	remain	outside	to	lose	even	more	significantly.	
All	the	same,	it	is	clear	that	the	stronger	recovery	in	the	transatlantic	economy	can	also	make	the	
demand	effect	in	third	countries	even	more	pronounced.	
Figure	 8	 shows	 the	 calculated	 effects.	As	 in	 the	 simulations	 already	 discussed,	 this	 is	 an	 “all	
other	things	being	equal”	effect,	i.e.,	it	includes	only	those	effects	that	can	be	traced	back	to	the	
transatlantic	 agreement.	 In	 the	 case	of	non-tariff	 barriers,	however,	 it	 is	 very	 likely	 that	many	
countries,	especially	the	traditional	trading	partners	of	the	EU	and	the	USA,	will	adopt	the	same	
standards	 and	 regulations.	 Under	 certain	 circumstances,	 it	 is	 even	 realistic	 for	 countries	 that	
already	have	free-trade	agreements	with	the	EU	or	USA	to	indirectly	participate	in	negotiations	
between	the	EU	and	USA,	so	that	their	concerns	are	taken	into	account.	This	does	not	show	up	in	
the	calculations,	so	the	negative	welfare	effects	may	be	exaggerated.	They	do	clearly	reflect	the	
trend,	however,	and	indicate	where	there	is	a	need	to	act.
It	is	even	more	obvious	than	in	the	tariff	scenario	that	the	traditional	trading	partners	of	Europe	
and	the	USA	are	hurt	by	the	agreement.	The	losses	that	would	be	experienced	by	Canada,	Mexico,	
Japan,	 Australia,	 Chile	 or	 Norway	 are	 substantial	 in	 this	 scenario.	 These	 countries	 are	 highly	
motivated	to	 imitate	 the	elimination	of	non-tariff	barriers	between	the	EU	and	USA	or	 improve	
their	partially	existing	bilateral	agreements	with	the	USA	and	EU,	or	to	enter	into	such	agreements.	
There	are	many	signs	that	exactly	such	efforts	are	now	underway.
For	the	world	in	general,	deep	liberalization	between	the	EU	and	USA	means	a	rise	in	average	
real	income	of	3.27%.	That	puts	enough	money	on	the	table	to	compensate	the	losers.	It	can	be	
hoped	that	the	agreement	increases	the	willingness	of	developing	and	emerging	countries	to	enter	
into	compromises	in	the	Doha	Development	Agenda.	At	the	same	time,	the	industrial	countries	
should	also	be	ready	to	make	compromises,	because	a	substantial	intensification	of	the	economic	
relationships	between	the	USA	and	EU	would	make	the	necessary	resources	available.
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Source: ifo Institut
Figure 8: Change in global real per capita income, deep liberalization
–9.5 bis –6.1 –6.0 bis –3.1 –3.0 bis 0.0 0.1 bis 3.0 3.1 bis 6.0 6.1 bis 13.4
–9.5
13.4
–7.2
–4.2
–4.7
–4.4 –3.4
–2.7
–2.6
–2.2
–1.7
–1.6
–5.6 –1.8
2.1
–3.2
–3.9
–2.1
7.3
–3.9 6.2
3.74.7
9.7
6.9
6.6
2.6
–1.7
–0.6
–0.4
–0.5
–1.65.0 –2.2
–1.1
–1.4
–0.8 –0.3
–0.4
–0.2
–1.3
–0.2
–2.2
0.7 –5.9
–7.4
–2.0
–2.8
–3.5
–2.7
–4.0
–3.0
–2.8
–2.6
–2.6 –2.6
–3.1
–2.6
–2.8
–1.5
–2.2
–1.5
–4.0
–1.2
–0.6
–4.1
–3.2
–3.3
–2.5
2.6
2.6
4.9 4.4
2.64.2
4.62.7
4.8
–2.6
5.7
5.4
–1.3
–0.8
–0.5
–0.7
5.1
31
What happens in the labor markets?
6. What happens in the labor markets?
While	the	previous	section	of	the	study	illuminated	the	trade	and	welfare	effects	of	both	scenarios,	
and	 the	 labor	 market	 effects	 were	 intentionally	 abstracted,	 the	 following	 section	 devotes	 its	
attention	to	the	decidedly	aggregated	employment	effects	of	eliminating	tariffs	as	well	as	of	a	deep	
liberalization	scenario.	For	this,	the	methodology	of	our	structural	model	of	foreign	trade	must	be	
expanded	with	an	explicit	model	for	the	labor	markets	in	the	countries	affected.	
6.1. Search unemployment and foreign trade 
The	model	used	so	far	does	not	explicitly	model	the	effects	on	the	labor	market	because	it	was	
developed	 in	 order	 to	 analyze	 trade	 flows.	 In	 the	 academic	 literature	 about	 evaluating	 trade	
liberalization	efforts,	 there	 is	a	 long	 tradition	of	 refraining	 from	explicit	modeling	of	 the	 labor	
market.	One	reason	may	be	the	long	lack	of	a	generally	accepted	model	for	labor	markets	and	their	
underlying	 institutions	 and	 frictions.	However,	 at	 the	 latest	when	Christopher	Pissarides,	Dale	
Mortensen	und	Peter	Diamond	were	honored	with	the	2010	Nobel	Prize	in	Economic	Sciences	for	
their	ground-breaking	insights	in	modeling	search	unemployment,	a	larger	segment	of	the	public	
finally	realized	that	a	generally	accepted	model	has	been	found.	What	differentiates	such	models	
is	that	they	depart	from	the	assumption	applied	in	classical	economics	that	the	wages	of	workers	
adapt	as	long	as	it	takes	for	all	those	seeking	work	to	have	a	job	offered	by	a	company.19	Obviously,	
this	 assumption	 contradicts	 the	 empirical	 fact	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 involuntary	 unemployment.	
Instead,	 these	models	 assume	 that	 the	unemployed	 first	 have	 to	 look	 for	 vacant	 positions	 and	
only	 find	 a	 job	with	 a	 degree	 of	 probability.	 Likewise,	 employers	must	 assume	 costs	 in	 order	
to	find	an	employee.	These	range	from	the	costs	of	an	ad	in	a	newspaper	or	on-line	platform	to	
the	assessment	centers,	selection	interviews	and	hiring	and	training	costs	that	new	employees	
generate.	 A	 company’s	 unfilled	 positions	 are	 likewise	 only	 filled	with	 a	 degree	 of	 probability.	
These	 frictions	 associated	 with	 the	 search	 lead	 to	 search	 (or	 frictional)	 unemployment;	 even	
during	an	economic	boom,	there	will	always	be	a	certain	number	of	unemployed	who	continue	
to	look	for	a	job.	Moreover,	labor	market	institutions	naturally	affect	the	unemployment	rate.	If	a	
country	has	a	good	employment	agency,	more	unemployed	will	find	jobs	and	unemployment	will	
be	 lower.	And	wage	 replacement	payments	 such	 as	unemployment	 benefits	 have	 an	 influence	
on	the	unemployment	rate.	A	major	advantage	of	this	modeling	approach	is	that	all	these	labor	
market	institutions	can	be	reproduced	within	the	model	framework.	Moreover,	the	model	explains	
the	simultaneous	existence	of	job	openings	and	unemployed	people.
19	 For	an	introduction	to	these	models,	see	Pissarides	(2000).
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Recent	 globalization	 research	 has	 taken	 advantage	 of	 these	modeling	 approaches,	 in	 order	 to	
introduce	them	into	existing	approaches	to	theoretical	modeling	of	trade	flows	between	countries.	
Among	the	pioneers	in	this	area	were	Davidson	and	Matusz	(1999).	The	most	recent	contributions	
in	this	field	are	by	Helpman	and	Itskhoki	(2010)	as	well	as	Felbermayr	et	al.	(2011).	Heid	and	Larch	
(2013)	have	taken	up	these	theoretical	studies	and	made	them	accessible	to	empirical	quantitative	
analysis.20	At	the	core,	this	empirical	structural	model	consists	of	an	expansion	of	the	models	we	
used	to	analyze	trade	flows	for	the	tariff	and	TTIP	scenarios	in	the	previous	sections	of	the	study	
for	explicit	modeling	of	 the	 labor	market.	The	results	 that	 follow	are	based	specifically	on	this	
methodological	approach.	Given	their	extensive	similarity,	there	will	be	only	a	short	discussion	of	
the	adapted	methodology	in	the	pages	that	follow.
The	empirical	strategy	is	analogous	to	the	previous	one:	we	set	the	model	using	the	observed	data	
in	such	a	way	that	the	trade	flows	observed	in	the	base	scenario	are	replicated	in	the	expected	
value.	The	difference	is	that	we	now	set	the	model	explicitly	for	the	observed	unemployment	rates.	
Moreover,	we	take	into	account	the	fact	that	in	different	countries,	there	are	different	incentives	
to	 taking	 a	 job,	 which	 result	 from	 differences	 in	 wage	 replacement	 payments	 (the	 average	
unemployment	benefits,	measured	as	a	percentage	of	the	average	wage).21	Then	we	analyze	the	
effects	of	the	tariff	and	deep	liberalization	scenarios.	Now,	however,	we	can	explicitly	investigate	
the	net	employment	effects	of	 these	 scenarios,	 and	calculate	 the	 firm	number	of	 jobs	 that	 are	
created	or	lost.	Moreover,	we	can	also	observe	the	change	in	real	wages.
From	 this	 sketch	 of	 the	methodology	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	while	 the	 analysis	 framework	now	
allows	explicit	investigation	of	the	labor	market,	it	is	“bought”	at	the	price	of	a	substantially	higher	
requirement	 for	 data.	 We	 additionally	 need	 comparable	 information	 on	 unemployment	 rates,	
employment	levels	and	the	wage	replacement	payments.	Concretely,	we	use	the	labor	market	data	
from	2010;	the	wage	replacement	rates	are	however	from	2009,	because	they	are	compiled	only	
every	two	years.	These	are	unfortunately	available	only	for	a	data	set	of	28	OECD	countries.22	Being	
limited	 to	 these	 industrialized	 countries	 guarantees	 that	 the	 labor	markets	 are	 comparable,	 at	
least	to	the	extent	that	other	factors,	such	as	informal	employment	or	subsistence	farming,	as	are	
common	in	Latin	America,	Africa	and	large	parts	of	Asia,	for	example,	do	not	distort	the	analysis.	
A	representation	of	the	labor	market	structures	of	these	countries	is	unfortunately	not	possible,	
given	the	(lack	of)	available	data.	
20	 	The	works	cited	above	are	not	a	complete	overview	of	the	literature;	for	that,	see	Heid	and	Larch	(2013).	There	is	also	an	exact	
description	of	the	model	framework	used.
21	 	Calculation	of	wage	replacement	payments	is	more	complicated	than	described	here.	We	are	using	OECD	data	that	calculates	an	
average	wage	replacement	rate	from	a	combination	of	different	worker	life	situations	(family	status,	number	of	children,	etc.).	
These	figures	provide	a	good	approximation	of	the	average	level	of	unemployment	benefits	for	a	cross-section	of	countries;	for	
details	see	OECD	(2010).
22	 	The	countries	are:	Australia,	Austria,	Belgium,	Canada,	Czech	Republic,	Denmark,	Finland,	France,	Germany,	Greece,	Hungary,	
Iceland,	 Ireland,	 Italy,	 Japan,	 Netherlands,	 New	 Zealand,	 Norway,	 Poland,	 Portugal,	 Slovakia,	 South	 Korea,	 Spain,	 Sweden,	
Switzerland,	Turkey,	United	Kingdom	and	United	States.
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Table	8	shows	the	unemployment	rates	used.	 In	the	data	 for	2010,	 the	effects	of	 the	continuing	
financial,	government	debt	and	euro	crisis	are	quite	evident:	Spain	had	the	highest	unemployment	
in	the	OECD	at	20%.	Germany,	in	the	European	comparison,	had	a	relatively	low	unemployment	
rate	of	7.46%,	while	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	USA,	at	just	below	10%,	reached	a	historical	peak.
	
Table 8: 2010 unemployment rates
Country 2010 unemployment rate in percent
Australia 5.23
Austria 4.39
Belgium 8.29
Canada 8.01
Czech Republic 7.28
Denmark 7.46
Finland 8.40
France 9.36
Germany 7.06
Greece 12.53
Hungary 11.16
Iceland 7.56
Ireland 13.64
Italy 8.42
Japan 5.03
Netherlands 4.45
New Zealand 6.53
Norway 3.61
Poland 9.62
Portugal 10.79
Slovakia 14.37
South Korea 3.72
Spain 20.06
Sweden 8.37
Switzerland 4.54
Turkey 11.88
United Kingdom 7.75
United States 9.63
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics (2010)
34
What happens in the labor markets?
To	ensure	the	comparability	of	the	results	with	those	in	the	previous	section,	despite	having	fewer	
countries	covered,	we	considered,	when	parameterizing	the	model	 that	grosso	modo,	 the	same	
aggregated	trade	creation	effects	between	the	EU	and	USA	are	achieved	in	both	scenarios	as	in	the	
model	with	the	126	countries	without	taking	labor	market	frictions	into	account.
	
6.2 Two million new jobs 
What	effect	does	elimination	of	the	trade	barriers	in	transatlantic	trade	have	on	the	unemployment	
rate?	How	many	 jobs	are	created?	And	how	do	real	wages	change?	To	answer	 these	questions,	
we	consider	 first	 the	unambitious	 tariff	 scenario	and	afterwards	describe	 the	effects	of	a	deep	
liberalization.	At	this	point	we	would	like	to	point	out	that	our	model	has	intentionally	removed	
the	economy-induced	changes	in	the	unemployment	rate	and	only	investigates	the	long-term	or	
accumulated	effects	of	trade	liberalization	on	the	unemployment	rate.	That	means	that	the	numbers	
presented	below	are	to	be	considered	long-term	results	or	equivalent	to	changes	in	employment	
independent	of	the	economic	cycle.	That	means,	for	example,	that	a	1	percentage	point	drop	in	the	
unemployment	rate	reduces	the	unemployment	rate	during	both	an	upswing	and	a	downswing	of	
the	economy	by	1	percent.
Tariff scenario
Table	9	shows	the	results	of	eliminating	the	existing	tariffs.	The	second	column	shows	the	percentage	
change	 in	 employment.	 Inversely,	 column	 3	 shows	 the	 changes	 in	 the	 unemployment	 rate.	
However,	this	is	the	change	in	percentage	points.	Concretely	this	means	that	the	tariff	elimination	
would	lower	the	unemployment	rate	in	Germany	by	0.11	percentage	points.	It	becomes	clear	that	
employment	rises	in	all	EU	countries	as	well	as	the	USA.	However,	the	changes	are	very	small	and	
for	the	EU	states	range	around	0.1	percentage	points.	An	exception	is	the	United	Kingdom,	which,	
because	of	its	special	closeness	to	the	USA	based	on	language	and	culture,	as	mentioned	above,	
profits	in	particular	with	a	reduction	of	its	unemployment	rate	by	0.34	percentage	points.	On	the	
other	hand,	in	the	countries	that	do	not	gain	from	tariff	reduction,	unemployment	rises	slightly.	
This	can	be	explained	by	relative	higher	trade	costs	between	these	countries	and	the	EU	and	USA.	
These	relatively	higher	trade	costs	lead	to	a	smaller	trading	volume,	i.e.,	less	demand	for	products	
from	these	countries,	which	reduces	production	in	the	affected	countries.	This	weakened	demand	
translates	directly	 into	a	 lower	employment	demand	 from	companies	 in	 the	affected	countries,	
which	leads	to	increased	unemployment.	Conversely,	the	now	relatively	lower	trade	costs	in	the	
USA	and	EU	mean	greater	demand	for	goods	from	the	EU	and	USA,	which	translates	into	new	
hires	and	ultimately	into	a	lower	unemployment	rate.
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When	we	weight	the	individual	changes	with	the	gross	domestic	product,	there	is	a	reduction	in	
the	unemployment	rates	in	the	28	countries	of	0.11	percentage	points.
In	a	trade	model	without	aggregated	employment	effects,	all	adaptations	occur	in	prices	and	wages.	
In	our	model	 framework,	a	portion	of	 these	effects	 is	diverted	 into	quantities,	 i.e.,	employment	
effects;	however	even	in	this	model	framework,	they	also	result	in	changes	in	(real)	wages.	Real	
wages	in	this	model	framework	are	also	an	adequate	measurement	of	welfare.	Here	we	see	that	
in	Germany,	real	wages	rise	0.54%,	in	the	USA	0.93%.	Here,	too,	the	United	Kingdom	profits	most	
with	a	real	wage	increase	of	1.72%.	The	countries	not	affected	by	the	tariff	reduction	must,	on	the	
other	hand,	accept	smaller	real	wage	cuts.	Overall,	however,	real	wages	rise	0.59%	in	the	OECD,	so	
that	even	considering	aggregated	unemployment	effects,	enough	profits	are	achieved	in	principle	
to	offset	the	disadvantaged	countries	through	transfer	payments,	for	example.	
Even	with	consideration	of	the	employment	effects,	it	appears	that	the	total	effects	of	only	tariff	
elimination	are	very	slight,	and	compared	to	the	economic	fluctuations	of	the	unemployment	rate,	
should	be	considered	negligible.
Figure	10	finally	offers	some	insight	into	the	effects	of	the	tariff	reduction	on	convergence	within	
the	EU.	It	shows	on	the	x	axis	the	unemployment	rates	in	2010	and	on	the	y	axis	the	reduction	
of	unemployment	 rates	 through	 tariff	 reduction.	 It	 is	 immediately	clear	 that	 in	all	EU	member	
countries,	 the	unemployment	rate	sinks,	 i.e.,	all	countries	profit	directly	from	a	revival	of	 their	
employment	markets.	The	straight	line	drawn	is	a	regression	line,	and	it	shows	a	positive	rise.23	
This	 should	 be	 interpreted	 as	 follows:	 the	 higher	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 an	 EU	 member	
country,	 the	greater	 the	reduction	of	 the	unemployment	 rate	 from	tariff	 reduction.	This	means	
that	tariff	elimination	contributes	to	a	convergence	of	the	labor	market	situation	within	the	EU:	
The	countries	with	the	most	precarious	labor	market	situations	profit	most.	The	graph	shows	the	
exceptional	situation	of	the	United	Kingdom,	which,	despite	its	relatively	low	unemployment	rate,	
benefits	the	most.
23	 	The	increase	coefficent	is	not	significant	of	0	different	based	on	the	United	Kingdom	outlier.	A	regression	line	without	that	outlier	
is	at	the	5%	significance	level	of	0	different	and	also	shows	a	clearly	positive	rise.
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Table 9: Change in employment, unemployment rates and real wages, tariff 
scenario
Country Percentage rise  
in employment 
Change in unemployment 
rate in percentage points 
Percentage change  
in real wages
Australia –0.12 0.11 –0.56
Austria 0.07 –0.07 0.32
Belgium 0.02 –0.02 0.09
Canada –0.15 0.15 –0.71
Czech Republic 0.11 –0.10 0.53
Denmark 0.13 –0.12 0.63
Finland 0.21 –0.19 0.97
France 0.12 –0.11 0.54
Germany 0.12 –0.11 0.54
Greece 0.20 –0.17 0.93
Hungary 0.15 –0.13 0.70
Iceland –0.12 0.11 –0.56
Ireland 0.24 –0.21 1.14
Italy 0.16 –0.15 0.72
Japan –0.03 0.03 –0.14
Netherlands 0.09 –0.08 0.40
New Zealand –0.08 0.07 –0.37
Norway –0.12 0.12 –0.55
Poland 0.15 –0.13 0.69
Portugal 0.22 –0.19 1.02
Slovakia 0.14 –0.12 0.66
South Korea –0.03 0.03 –0.15
Spain 0.20 –0.16 0.92
Sweden 0.18 –0.16 0.85
Switzerland –0.11 0.10 –0.50
Turkey –0.11 0.10 –0.51
United Kingdom 0.37 –0.34 1.72
United States 0.20 –0.18 0.93
Average (GDP–weighted) 0.13 –0.11 0.59
Source: Calculations: ifo Institut
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Deep liberalization 
Let	us	now	look	at	the	deep	liberalization	scenario.	Table	10	reports	the	corresponding	results.	It	
is	immediately	clear	that	the	effects	for	EU	countries	are	about	four	times	as	large	as	in	the	tariff	
reduction	scenario.	For	example,	in	Germany	the	unemployment	rate	drops	by	0.43	percentage	
points,	which	 corresponds	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 employment	 of	 0.47%.	 In	 the	USA,	 the	 decline	 in	
unemployment	is	0.71	percentage	points	and	in	the	United	Kingdom,	even	1.27	percentage	points.	
Countries	affected	by	the	bank	and	government	debt	crisis	also	do	especially	well:	Unemployment	
in	Spain	drops	0.62	percentage	points,	in	Greece	and	Portugal	by	about	0.7	percentage	points	and	
in	Ireland	even	by	0.84	percentage	points.	The	effect	for	Ireland	despite	the	common	language	
with	the	USA	is	smaller	than	in	the	United	Kingdom	is	due	to	the	relatively	marginal	position	of	
Ireland	in	comparison	to	the	United	Kingdom.	
Source: Calculations: ifo Institut
Figure 9: Reduction of the unemployment rate and 2010 unemployment 
rate, tariff scenario 
Line shows linear regression.
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Even	with	consideration	of	the	quantitative	(or	employment)	effects,	the	impact	on	prices,	here	
real	wages,	and	thus	on	consumer	welfare,	is	substantially	larger:	In	Germany	real	wages	are	2.19%	
higher	and	in	the	countries	severely	affected	by	the	crisis	just	mentioned,	at	least	3%	higher.	It	
is	thus	apparent	that	deep	liberalization,	besides	providing	higher	positive	employment	effects,	
offers	substantially	higher	welfare	effects	than	does	 just	eliminating	tariffs.	However,	 there	are	
also	losers	in	this	scenario	within	the	OECD:	It	 is	those	countries	that	are	not	part	of	the	TTIP	
agreement.	However,	even	in	their	case,	on	average,	the	real	GDP-weighted	wage	increase	is	2.34%,	
so	that	there	are	sufficient	profits	available	for	the	third	countries	that	don’t	participate	to	be	able	
to	be	compensated	for	their	real	wage	losses.	On	average,	the	OECD	unemployment	rate	falls	by	
0.45	percentage	points.
This	 is	 especially	 remarkable:	 The	 implementation	 of	 TTIP	 is	 thus	 not	 a	 zero-sum	 game	 but	
generates	 real	welfare	 gains	 from	 the	 elimination	 of	 real	 trade	 costs,	 so	 that	 (in	 principle)	 all	
countries	can	benefit	from	this	reduction.
The	underlying	mechanism	is	the	same	as	in	the	tariff	scenario:	The	increase	in	export	demand	
triggered	 by	 the	 reduction	 of	 trade	 costs	 leads	 to	 more	 hiring	 by	 companies,	 which	 directly	
causes	the	unemployment	rate	to	fall.	At	the	same	time,	this	causes	consumption	of	goods	to	rise	
domestically,	based	on	the	higher	number	of	people	working,	which	again	causes	more	demand	
for	 imports	 from	 other	 TTIP	member	 countries.	 These	 positive	 spillover	 effects	 in	 the	 general	
equilibrium	 with	 consideration	 for	 trade	 intertwining	 between	 countries	 reinforce	 the	 pure	
reduction	of	trade	costs.
	
Figure	11,	analogous	to	Figure	10,	provides	a	clear	description	of	 the	convergence	between	EU	
member	countries:	The	graphs	look	very	similar	but	the	values	on	the	y	axis	are	much	higher.	It	
is	also	evident	here	that	the	higher	the	unemployment	rate	in	an	EU	member	country	before	TTIP,	
the	lower	it	will	be	after	implementation	of	a	deep	TTIP	agreement.24	
	
24	 	The	slope	coefficient	for	this	graph	is	likewise	not	significant	from	0	different	because	of	the	United	Kingdom	outlier.	A	regression	
line	without	this	outlier	is	at	the	5%	significance	level	of	0	different	and	also	shows	a	clear	positive	slope.
39
What happens in the labor markets?
Table 10: Change in employment, unemployment rate and real wages,  
deep liberalization 
Country Percentage rise  
in employment 
Change in unemployment 
rate in percentage points 
Percentage change  
in real wages 
Australia –0.47 0.44 –2.14
Austria 0.28 –0.27 1.33
Belgium 0.09 –0.08 0.42
Canada –0.60 0.56 –2.75
Czech Republic 0.46 –0.42 2.14
Denmark 0.54 –0.50 2.54
Finland 0.81 –0.75 3.84
France 0.47 –0.43 2.22
Germany 0.47 –0.43 2.19
Greece 0.78 –0.68 3.68
Hungary 0.60 –0.53 2.81
Iceland –0.46 0.42 –2.12
Ireland 0.97 –0.84 4.61
Italy 0.62 –0.57 2.90
Japan –0.11 0.11 –0.53
Netherlands 0.35 –0.34 1.65
New Zealand –0.30 0.28 –1.40
Norway –0.46 0.44 –2.12
Poland 0.58 –0.53 2.75
Portugal 0.85 –0.76 4.03
Slovakia 0.56 –0.48 2.63
South Korea –0.13 0.12 –0.58
Spain 0.78 –0.62 3.65
Sweden 0.72 –0.65 3.37
Switzerland –0.43 0.41 –1.96
Turkey –0.42 0.38 –1.94
United Kingdom 1.38 –1.27 6.60
United States 0.78 –0.71 3.68
Average (GDP–weighted) 0.50 –0.45 2.34
Source: Calculations: ifo Institut
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Conclusion – 2 million jobs with deep liberalization
Generally,	the	view	expressed	in	the	previous	analyses	is	confirmed:	While	a	pure	tariff	elimination	
would	have	positive	welfare	and	employment	effects	for	the	EU	and	USA,	the	positive	effects	of	
deep	liberalization	are	many	times	greater.	It	is	also	clear	that	any	fears	about	EU	countries	drifting	
farther	apart	as	a	result	of	the	liberalization	efforts	are	unfounded;	on	the	contrary,	the	agreement	
contributes	toward	harmonizing	the	labor	market	situations	and	living	conditions	within	the	EU.	
This	emphasizes	the	special	significance	of	a	comprehensive	liberalization	in	giving	a	detectible	
stimulus	to	the	economies	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic.	
Finally,	in	Table	11	we	provide	an	overview	of	the	net	additional	jobs	created	in	both	scenarios	in	
the	OECD,	i.e.,	conversion	of	the	changes	in	the	unemployment	rate	into	jobs.	A	deep	liberalization	
will	create	about	181,000	new	jobs	 in	Germany,	and	more	than	a	million	 in	 the	USA.	The	total	
amount	 shows	a	growth	 in	 employment	 in	 all	OECD	countries	 of	more	 than	2	million	 jobs;	 in	
the	 less	ambitious	tariff	scenario,	about	half	a	million.	These	numbers	make	it	especially	clear	
that	the	deep	liberalization	generates	important	employment	stimuli.	It	should	also	be	considered	
in	 this	 context	 that	 positive	 spillover	 effects	 based	 on	 psychological	 factors	 (boom	mood	 after	
Source: Calculations: ifo Institut.
Figure 10: Drop in the unemployment rate and the 2010 unemployment 
rate, deep liberalization 
Line shows linear regression.
Sweden
Austria
Belgium
United Kingdom
Spain
Netherlands
Slovakia
Greece
Portugal
Poland Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Germany France
Denmark
Finland
Czech Republic
0 5 10 15 20 25
0,0
0,3
0,6
0,9
1,2
1,5
Unemployment rate in 2010
Re
du
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
41
What happens in the labor markets?
comprehensive	liberalization)	were	not	included	in	our	modeling.	It	is	probable	that	these	effects	
would	make	the	figures	even	more	positive.
Table 11: Number of jobs created in both scenarios 
Country Deep liberalization Tariff scenario 
Australia –52,332 –13,591
Austria 11,638 2,828
Belgium 4,062 873
Canada –101,854 –26,176
Czech Republic 22,278 5,527
Denmark 14,623 3,646
Finland 20,066 5,134
France 121,566 29,921
Germany 181,092 44,831
Greece 34,277 8,766
Hungary 22,613 5,691
Iceland –769 –201
Ireland 18,115 4,549
Italy 140,979 35,538
Japan –71,833 –19,030
Netherlands 29,535 7,121
New Zealand –6,606 –1,748
Norway –11,541 –3,001
Poland 93,333 23,466
Portugal 42,521 10,878
Slovakia 12,995 3,259
South Korea –29,841 –7,912
Spain 143,098 36,457
Sweden 32,515 8,241
Switzerland –18,224 –4,640
Turkey –94,831 –24,625
United Kingdom 400,203 106,134
United States 1,085,501 276,623
Jobs created in the OECD 2,043,178 518,558
Source: Calculations: ifo Institut
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7. Summary
In	 this	 study	we	 examined	 the	macroeconomic	 effects	 of	 a	 transatlantic	 trade	 and	 investment	
partnership	(TTIP)	between	the	EU	and	USA.	Two	scenarios	were	examined:	(i)	the	elimination	of	
tariffs	in	transatlantic	trade,	(ii)	a	deep,	comprehensive	liberalization	of	trade	in	which	regulatory	
barriers	 to	market	 access	 are	 also	 reduced.	 To	 do	 so,	 an	 empirical	 approach	was	 chosen	 that	
applies	 to	 the	 agreement	 of	 those	 trade-creating	 effects	 that	 can	 be	measured	 in	 comparable,	
already	existing	free-trade	agreements.	By	doing	so,	the	direct	quantification	of	non-tariff	trade	
barriers	and	speculation	about	their	removal	as	part	of	the	agreement	can	be	avoided.	
The	most	important	results	can	be	summarized	as	follows:
1.	 	Trade	 between	 the	 USA	 and	 Germany	 is	 not	 significantly	 strengthened	 by	 eliminating	
tariffs.	Reduction	of	non-tariff	barriers	above	and	beyond	tariffs	as	part	of	a	comprehensive	
liberalization	 scenario	has	much	bigger	 effects.	 The	 growth	 to	 be	 expected	 is	 in	 the	90%	
range.
2.	 	For	other	EU	countries,	trade	growth	of	a	similar	scale	can	be	expected.	In	all	cases	it	was	true	
that	growth	from	simply	eliminating	tariffs	is	negligible.
3.	 	Germany’s	trade	with	its	traditional	trade	partners	in	Europe	declines	sharply	in	some	areas	
in	the	comprehensive	scenario	(e.g.,	with	France:	–23%).	This	is	due	to	the	reversal	of	the	trade	
diversion	caused	in	the	European	Customs	Union	and	domestic	market.	Similar	effects	exist	
also	for	the	other	EU	countries,	for	example	for	Great	Britain.	The	trade	policy	intertwining	of	
EU	countries	among	themselves	declines.
4.	 	Germany’s	trade	with	the	BRICS	countries	(Brazil,	Russia,	India,	China,	South	Africa)	would	
drop	because	of	the	comprehensive	agreement	by	about	10%	relative	to	the	initial	equilibrium.	
Given	the	massive	expansion	of	transatlantic	trade,	this	is	a	slight	effect.	USA	trade	with	the	
BRICS	countries	would	however	decline	more	sharply	(30%).
5.	 	EU	 trade	 with	 neighboring	 states	 in	 North	 Africa	 or	 Eastern	 Europe	 would	 decline	 by	 an	
average	of	5%	from	the	comprehensive	agreement.	This	results	from	the	circumstance	that	the	
TTIP	partially	devalues	existing	preference	agreements.
6.	 	A	free-trade	agreement	between	the	USA	and	EU	has	important	welfare	effects	on	the	countries	
directly	involved	and	on	countries	that	are	only	indirectly	affected	by	the	agreement.	Within	
the	EU	as	well	there	are	differences	cutting	across	the	countries.	Within	Europe,	the	Baltic	
states	benefit	most	from	eliminating	tariffs	in	trade	with	the	USA.	Relative	high	gains	arise	
also	in	Great	Britain	and	in	the	countries	bordering	the	Mediterranean.	Germany	can	expect	an	
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increase	in	real	per	capita	income	of	0.24%.	Located	at	the	other	end	are	France,	the	Benelux	
countries	and	Austria	with	its	neighbors.	The	average	is	0.27%.
7.	 	Reducing	non-tariff	barriers	has	clearly	greater	effects	on	real	per	capita	incomes	in	Europe	
than	 just	eliminating	tariffs.	 It	now	can	be	seen	that	Great	Britain	would	especially	benefit	
from	the	initiative	(growth	of	9.70%).	The	Scandinavian	member	states,	the	Baltic	countries	
and	Spain	see	above-average	increases.	Germany	profits	at	4.68%	a	bit	less	than	the	average,	
which	is	4.95%.	France,	with	2.64%,	gains	relatively	little	in	comparison.
8.	 	Dropping	transatlantic	tariffs	to	zero	gives	the	most	help	to	the	poorer	EU	member	countries.	
Member	states	whose	per	capita	income	in	2011	was	50%	below	that	of	France	could	expect	
welfare	gains	that	are	about	0.1%	higher	than	those	of	France.	In	the	case	of	reducing	the	non-
tariff	barriers,	no	convergence	effect	can	be	statistically	proven.
9.	 	The	USA	gains	substantially	more	than	the	EU.	In	the	tariff	scenario,	the	real	per	capita	income	
rises	about	0.8%;	in	a	deep	liberalization	of	non-tariff	barriers,	the	gains	rise	to	about	13.4%.	
These	high	gains	result	from	the	fact	of	already	low	trade	barriers	with	the	large	European	
countries	like	Great	Britain	but	also	Germany.
10.		Liberalization	of	trade	between	the	EU	and	USA	leads	to	trade	creation	between	the	partners	
but	to	evident	trade	diversion	in	trade	with	third	countries.	With	pure	tariff	elimination,	the	
countries	 of	West	Africa,	which	 traditionally	 trade	 a	 lot	with	 Europe,	 lose	 up	 to	 about	 7%.	
However,	there	are	also	winners	among	the	third	countries:	Brazil,	Kazakhstan	and	Indonesia	
have	higher	percentage	gains	than	Europe	from	positive	indirect	effects.	Welfare	rises	by	about	
0.1%.
11.	 	If	 the	non-tariff	barriers	between	EU	and	USA	are	 liberalized	 in	addition	 to	 the	 tariffs,	 the	
per	capita	income	in	a	global	average	rises	a	good	3.27%.	The	trade	diversion	effects	are,	in	
comparison	to	the	customs	scenario,	only	insignificantly	larger,	but	distributed	among	third	
countries	in	a	different	way.	Now	the	traditional	trading	partners	of	the	USA,	such	as	Mexico,	
Canada	 and	 Chile	 experience	 substantial	 losses;	 likewise	 Australia,	 Japan	 and	 Israel	 each	
lose	between	9.5	und	5.5%.	These	countries	therefore	have	strong	incentives	to	participate	in	
negotiating	the	liberalization	of	non-tariff	barriers.
12.		If	search	unemployment	is	considered	in	the	model	calculations,	it	appears	possible,	at	least	
for	data	reasons	only	for	the	OECD	countries,	that	TTIP	leads	to	a	rise	in	employment	and	a	
decline	in	unemployment	in	the	USA,	EU	and	on	average	all	OECD	states.	In	the	tariff	scenario,	
the	 effects	 are	 small;	 with	 comprehensive	 liberalization,	 they	 are	 noticeably	 larger.	 In	 the	
OECD	average,	the	unemployment	rate	falls	by	about	0.5	percentage	points.
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13.	 	TTIP	leads	in	some	countries	to	job	losses.	In	the	ambitious	scenario,	these	amount	to	up	to	
100,000	jobs	(in	Canada).	In	the	OECD	average,	however,	a	total	of	2	million	additional	jobs	
are	created.	Even	in	the	tariff	scenario,	the	growth	in	jobs	amounts	to	half	a	million	jobs.
14.	 	Real	wages	in	the	directly	affected	countries	rise	on	average;	in	the	OECD	average,	through	
a	deep	TTIP,	they	rise	by	about	2.3%,	with	the	growth	in	Great	Britain,	Ireland	or	USA	higher	
than,	for	example,	in	Germany.
15.	 	In	countries	where	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	initial	equilibrium	is	higher	than	average,	
TTIP	 leads	 to	 an	 above-average	 decline	 in	 unemployment.	 This	 applies	 both	 to	 a	 simple	
lowering	of	tariffs	as	well	as	to	deep	liberalization.	TTIP	therefore	also	leads	to	convergence	
on	the	labor	markets	within	the	OECD.
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